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This paper investigates the empirical relevance of a new framework for monetary pol-
icy analysis in which the decision makers are allowed to weight di¤erently positive and
negative deviations of in‡ation and output from the target values. Reduced-form and
structural estimates of the central bank …rst order condition indicate that the preferences
of the Fed have been highly asymmetric only before 1979, with the response to output
contractions being larger than the response to output expansions of the same magnitude.
This asymmetry is shown to induce an average in‡ation bias of 1:11% that appears to
have substantially contributed to the great in‡ation of the 1960s and 1970s.
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11 Introduction
A popularmethod of monetary model building isto regardpolicy interventions as thesolution
of an optimal control problem in which the central bank minimizes some quadratic criterion
subject to a linear structureof theeconomy. Thequadratic characteristicofthe objective and
the linear feature of the constraints give rise to a linear …rst order condition, usually referred
to as a targeting rule (see Svensson, 1999), that describes the optimal response of the central
bank to the developments in the economy. While the quadratic speci…cation implies that
monetary authorities evenly weight positive and negative deviations of in‡ation and output
from the target values, such a modeling choice has been questioned by several practitioners
at the policy committees of various central banks on the ground that it has little justi…cation
beyond analytical tractability.1
Blinder(1997, p. 6) arguesthat’academic macroeconomists tendtouse quadratic loss func-
tions for reason of mathematical convenience, without thinking much about their substantive
implications. The assumption is not innocuous, [...] practical central bankers and academics
would bene…t from more serious thinking about the functional form of the loss function’. De-
scribing his experience as Fed vice-Chairman Blinder (1998, pp. 19-20) pushes the argument
even further and claims ’in most situations the central bank will take far more political heat
when it tightens pre-emptively to avoid higher in‡ation than when it eases pre-emptively to
avoid higher unemployment’, suggesting that political pressures can induce asymmetric cen-
tral bank interventions. Similar concerns appear to emerge also at other central banks like the
ECB and in the occasion of an interest rate cut of 50 point basis Duisenberg (2001) states ’the
maintenance of price stability remains our …rst priority. [...] today’s action could be taken
”without prejudice to price stability”, and it thereby supported the other goals of EMU, such
as economic growth’.
On the academic side, several recent studies explore novel mechanisms through which
the costs of the business cycle can be asymmetric. Persson and Tabellini (1999) combine
retrospective voting with imperfect information about the incumbent’s talent to show that
careerconcerned politicianscan makereappointment morelikely by endowingthecentral bank
with an asymmetric objective that requires a larger monetary policy response in periods of
1The few notable exceptions include Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and Woodford (2003, ch. 6), who
show that the quadratic form can be obtained as a second order approximation of the representative agent’s
utility function.
2poor economic performance.2 Galí, Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2003a) construct a theoretical
measure of welfare gap that is based on price and wage markups, and …nd that the costs of
output ‡uctuationsfor theUS havebeen historically largeandasymmetric. Erosa andVentura
(2002) introduce transaction costs and heterogeneity in portfolio holdings in an otherwise
neo-classical model and show that these frictions can make the costs of in‡ation variation
asymmetric. Lastly, thepsychology ofchoicerevealsthat peopletend to place a greater weight
on the prospect of losses than on the prospect of gains in decision making under uncertainty
(see Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), suggesting that also policy makers, who aggregate over
individual welfare, may be loss-averse.
Despite its intuitive appeal, only a few studies have attempted to identify asymmetric
central bank behaviorsand the relevance ofthis alternative framework remains to be assessed.
Cukierman and Muscatelli (2003), Martin and Milas (2004), and Kim, Osborne and Sensier
(2004) show some international evidence that supports the notion of nonlinear interest rate
rules. Ruge-Murcia (2003 and 2004), and Cukierman and Gerlach (2003) adopt an in‡ation
rate reaction function that is nonlinear in either in‡ation or the output gap, and using data
for some OECD economy they favor the hypothesis of an asymmetric objective. Dolado,
Maria-Dolores and Ruge-Murcia (2003) estimate an optimal interest rate rule that is drawn
upon the existence of asymmetric preferences on in‡ation only, and …nd that US monetary
policy can be characterized by a nonlinear function after 1983.
Thispapercontributes to the literature on monetary policy rules in several respects. First,
it proposesa general, potentially asymmetricspeci…cationforboth thein‡ationandtheoutput
objectives that nests the quadratic form as a special case. Accordingly, the optimal policy
rule is nonlinear if and only if the preferences of the central bank are asymmetric. Second,
the analytical solution of the optimal control problem allows us to identify the degree of
nonlinearity and asymmetry with respect to both objectives, a result that to our knowledge
of the existing literature comes as new. Third, the model generates the testable prediction
that the monetary authorities respond not only to the level of in‡ation and output gaps
as suggested by Taylor (1993) but also to their squared values. Fourth, reduced-form and
structural estimates of US monetary policy rules indicatethat nonlinearity is a robust feature
of the postwar data only before 1979 and with respect to the output gap. While this …nding
2De Long (1997) forcefully argues that US monetary policy during the 1970s was highly sensitive to the
political pressures for a higher money growth and lowerinterest rates, and provides extensive narrative evidence
about the in‡uence of Nixon’s administration on the Chairmanship of Arthur Burns at the Fed.
3is consistent with the notion of a Fed’s policy regime shift, it provides an explanation for the
great in‡ation of the 1960s and 1970s as the model predicts that asymmetric preferences over
the output gap generate an average in‡ation bias. The latter is found to move from 1:11%
before 1979 to a value not statistically di¤erent from zero over the last two decades.
The road map of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model and derives the
interest rate rule asthe…rst ordercondition ofthecentral bank optimization problem. Section
3 reports the estimates of both the policy rule coe¢cients and the preference parameters, and
conducts a robustness analysis. The following section shows that asymmetric preferences on
the output gap induce an average in‡ation bias, and proposes a simple strategy to decompose
the actual in‡ation mean into a target and a bias argument. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theoretical model
We assumethat the central bank conductsmonetary policy through a targeting rule according
to theterminology ofSvensson (1999). Thus, all availableinformationareused tobring at each
point in time the target variables in linewith their targets by penalizing any futuredeviation
of the former from the latter. The policy rule is modeled as the discretionary outcome of an
intertemporal optimization problem in which the decision makers minimize a given criterion
subject to the constraints provided by the structure of the economy. The optimizing device
allows us to back out the objectives of the monetary authorities, which are unobserved, from
the observed path of policy rates implying that evidence on the latter can be interpreted as
informative about the former. Since our identi…cation strategy relies on the estimation of a
model-based speci…cation for thereaction function, wechallenge theassumption ofsymmetric
policy preferences in the context of a popular framework for monetary policy analysis. This
is a version of the New-Keynesian model of the business cycle derived in Yun (1996), and
Woodford (2003, chs. 3 and 4), among many others.3
2.1 The structure of the economy
This subsection describes an aggregate, log-linearized version of the New-Keynesian forward-
looking model with sticky prices that has been recently summarized by Clarida, Galí and
Gertler (1999). The evolution of the economy is compactly represented by the following two-
3Surico (2003) shows that both the theoretical and the empirical results obtained here using a New-Kynesian
model are robust to the speci…cation of a Lucas aggregate supply curve as structure of the economy.
4equation system:
¼t = µEt¼t+1 +kyt +"s
t (1)
yt = Etyt+1 ¡'(it ¡Et¼t+1) +"d
t (2)
Equation (1) captures the staggered feature of a Calvo-type world in which each …rm
adjusts its price with a constant probability in any given period, and independently from the
time elapsedfromthelast adjustment. Thediscretenatureofpricesetting createsan incentive
to adjust prices by more the higher is the future in‡ation expected at time t. The in‡ation
level is ¼t whereas the output gap is denoted by yt and captures the movements in marginal
costs associated with variations in excess demand. For analytical convenience, the aggregate
supply curveisassumed purely forward-looking. Galí and Gertler (1999), Ireland (2001), Galí,
Gertler and Lopez-Salido (2003b), and Smets and Wouters (2003a) provideempirical support
for this choice as a good …rst approximation to the dynamics of US in‡ation.
Equation (2) is a standard Euler equation for consumption combined with the relevant
market clearing condition. It basically brings the notion of consumption smoothing into an
aggregatedemand formulation by making theoutput gap a positivefunction ofitsfuturevalue
and a negativefunction of the real interest rate, it¡Et¼t+1. Lastly, "s
t and "d
t are respectively
cost and demand disturbances that obey an autoregressive, mean reverting process.
2.2 An asymmetric speci…cation of the loss function
An important aspect of monetary policy making is that policy actions are taken before the
realization ofeconomicshocks and thereforebefore thevariables in the system aredetermined.
Accordingly, the problem of the central bank is to choose the interest rate at the beginning
of period t conditional upon the information available at the end of theprevious period. This







where ± is the discount factor and L stands for the period loss function.
Our framework di¤ers from the conventional quadratic set up in that we employ a more
general speci…cation of the monetary authorities’ objectives. Indeed, the quadratic form may
approximate reasonably well a number of di¤erent functions and in the absence of a rigorous
theoretical foundation any speci…c nonquadratic proposal is destined to be unsatisfactory
5against the wide range of plausible alternatives. Hence, rather than attempting to uncover
the correct functional form ofpolicy makers’ preferences, weevaluatethesymmetricquadratic
setup upon the empirical merits of the monetary policy rule that this speci…cation implies.



























The coe¢cients ¸ and ¹ represent the central bank’s aversion towards output ‡uctuations
around potential and towards interest rate level ‡uctuations around thetarget i¤. The policy
preference towards in‡ation stabilization is normalized to one and therefore ¸ and ¹ are
expressed in relative terms. The in‡ation target is ¼¤ whereas theparameters® and ° capture
any asymmetry in the objective function of the monetary authorities.
Thecubicspeci…cation (4) departuresfromthequadraticin that policy makersareallowed,
but not required, to treat di¤erently positive and negative deviations of in‡ation and output
from the target. A negative value of ° implies that, everything equals, an output contraction
relative to thepotential level is weighted more severely than an output expansion. To see this
notice that whenever yt < 0 the cubic term, °y3
t, is positive and ampli…es the penalty due
to the quadratic component. Conversely, for values of output above potential the quadratic
and the cubic terms move in opposite directions implying that a positive deviation of a given
amount is associated with a smaller loss than a negative deviation of the same size. Figure
1 compares the standard quadratic with the asymmetric cubic function using the historical
values of the output gap and the estimates of ° reported below.
A similar reasoning holds for the coe¢cient ® that captures any asymmetry in the policy
preferences for stabilizing in‡ation around the target. However, if the monetary authorities
aremore concerned about overshooting ¼¤ rather than undershooting it, the value of ®would
be positive meaning that high in‡ation relative to thetarget is morecostly than low in‡ation.
It should be noted that while these sign predictions seem plausible given the sample we use,
the cubic speci…cation does not prevent ® to benegative corresponding to a casein which the
risk of de‡ation outweighs the risk of in‡ation.4
4The cubic speci…cation can also be interpreted as some third-order approximation around (¼t ¡¼
¤) = 0
and yt = 0 to the linex function proposed by Nobay and Peel (2003), and employed by Chadha and Schellekens
(1999), Geraats (1999) and Ruge-Murcia (2003 and 2004). The advantage of using the cubic form as the prim-
itive function is that it does not require any approximation of the optimal monetary policy rule. Nevertheless,
for a realistic range of values for (¼t ¡¼
¤) like [¡0:04; 0:09] and for yt like [¡0:08; 0:06], and given the estimates
of ® and ° reported below, the cubic and the linex function behave very similarly.
6The cubic loss function nests the quadratic form as a special case such that ® = ° = 0








latter can be obtained as a second order approximation of the utility-based welfare function
in a New-Keynesian model of the business cycle that involves a zero lower bound for nominal
interest rate (see Woodford, 2003, ch. 6). Accordingly, the policy preferences would be
functions of some primitive parameters of the model implying that potential evidence of
asymmetries in the central bank objective could be tracked into evidence of asymmetries in
the representative agent’s utility. Indeed, as argued by Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999),
the representative agent approach can be misleading as a guide to welfare analysis and in
the absence of complete markets it is likely that some groups su¤er more in recessions than
others. This suggests that an asymmetric utility-based speci…cation of the loss function may
be a desirable representation of the social costs associated with the business cycle.
2.3 A nonlinear policy rule
We solve for theoptimal monetary policy under discretion. Becauseno endogenousstatevari-
able enters themodel, the intertemporal problem reduces to a sequence of static optimization




























subject to ¼t =kyt +ft and yt =¡'it +gt, where Ft ´Et¡1
P1
¿=1 ±¿Lt+¿, ft ´µEt¼t+1 +"s
t
and gt ´ Etyt+1 +'Et¼t+1 +"d
t are taken as given re‡ecting the fact that the monetary
authorities cannot directly manipulate expectations. The …rst order condition reads








t +¹ (it ¡i¤) =0 (5)
and it implicitly describes the optimal, potentially nonlinear response of the central bank to
the developments in the economy. Equation (5) nests the linear form as a special case and
whenever ® = ° = 0 the reaction function collapses to an implicit interest rate rule of the
type analyzed in Rudebusch (2002), and Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000):
¡k'Et¡1 (¼t ¡¼¤) ¡¸'Et¡1 (yt) +¹(it ¡i¤) = 0
This feature is attractive as it delivers a joint restriction on policy makers’ preferences
that can be formally tested for. The parameters ® and ° are indeed crucial for the analysis
7of optimal monetary policy not only because they introduce an asymmetric motive in the
central bank objective function but also because, more importantly, they make nonlinear an
otherwise conventional policy rule. This suggests that the hypothesis of symmetric central
bank preferences can be tested simply by evaluating the functional form of the interest rate
reaction function as the latter would correspond to test whether the structural parameters ®
and ° are signi…cantly di¤erent from zero.
3 Empirical results
This section reports the estimates and the relevant tests of the optimal policy rule. The
analysis is conducted on US quarterly data spanning the period 1960:1-2003:2. The data set
has been obtained in July 2003 from the web site of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
and embodies alternative measures of in‡ation and output gap. In thebaseline case, in‡ation
is measured as the changes in the log of the consumer price index (CPI) while the output
gap is constructed using the series of potential output provided by the Congressional Budget
O¢ce (CBO). Figure 2 plots the baseline series. As a way to provide a robustness check, we
also report the results for two alternative measures of in‡ation and output gap, namely the
GDP de‡ator and the Hodrick-Prescott …ltered real GDP.5
We divide the full sample around the third quarter of 1979 which corresponds to the
appointment of Paul Volcker as Fed Chairman. This lines up with a number of empirical
studies that demonstrate a signi…cant di¤erence in the way monetary policy was conducted
pre- and post-1979 (see Clarida, Galí and Gertler, 2000, and Favero and Rovelli, 2003 among
many others). Moreover, we remove from the second sub-sample the period 1979:3-1982:3
when, as documented by Bernanke and Mihov (1998), the operating procedure of the Fed
temporarily switched from federal funds rate to non-borrowed reserves targeting. Finally, we
address the issue of subsample stability by re-evaluating the model over the Chairmanship of
Alan Greenspan, namely 1987:3-2003:2.
5The use of a low frequency …lter to obtain estimates of the target level of real activities does not contrast
with the model-based de…nition of ‡exible-price level of output. As argued by Woodford (2003, ch. 7), the
central bank can make society better o¤ by accommodating technology and preference shocks while o¤setting
disturbances to in‡ationand wage mark-ups. In this vein, Smets and Wouters (2003b) show thatifthe monetary
authorities wish to hedge against shocks of unknown nature, they would regard persistent disturbances as the
only shocks a¤ecting the target level of output. When applied to an estimated New-Keynesian model for the
Euro area, they …nd that the counterfactual ‡exible-price level of output, which is the one responding to all
non-monetary shocks in the economy, is indeed extremely volatile, whereas the target level of output, which is
the one only a¤ected by supply and demand disturbances, actually follows a relatively smooth path.
8We estimatea version ofthe central bank Euler equation using theGeneralized Method of
Moments (GMM) with an optimal weighting matrix that accounts for possible heteroskedas-
ticity and serial correlation in the error terms (see Hansen, 1982). In practice, we employ a
four lag Newey-West estimate of the covariance matrix. Starting from date t¡1, four lags of
the explanatory variables, thefederal fundsrates and themeasure ofin‡ationleft out from the
regression are included as instruments corresponding to a set of 19 overidentifying restrictions
that can be tested for.
3.1 Preliminary Analysis
The quadratic terms in (5) stem from asymmetric central bank preferences but we cannot
exclude in principle that some alternative source like a nonlinear Phillips curve might also
return evidence of nonlinearity in the policy rule (see Schaling, 1999). A simple way to
discriminate between nonquadratic objectives and nonlinear constraints is to perform the
REgression Speci…cationError Test (RESET), which is designed to detect incorrect functional
forms, on the New-Keynesian Phillips curve. Accordingly, we estimate equation (1) over the
full sample using Instrumental Variables and a twelve-lag Newey-West variance covariance
matrix. The set of instruments dated at time t ¡1 includes four lags of the GDP de‡ator
in‡ation, the CBO output gap, the long-short interest rate spread, and the CPI in‡ation.
When the squared, and then the squared and the cubes of the predictions ^ ¼t are added
to the original equation, the corresponding F-tests show that the null hypothesis of non-
misspeci…cation is not rejected. This suggests that the US aggregate supply curve is well
approximated by a linear relation, consistently with the …ndings in Dolado, Maria-Dolores
and Ruge-Murcia (2003), and Dolado, Maria-Dolores and Naveira (2004).
An additional form of nonlinearity comes from the policy makers’ (mis)perception of the
state of the economy. Suppose that on the basis of the estimates available in real-time the
Fed believed for part of the sample that the output gap was larger than the revised data
indicates. Then, the policy interventions during that period may appear surprisingly activist
given the values of the gap from the 2003 vintage. However, using real-time data Orphanides
(2004) …nds that the Fed response to the output gap was actually more activist in the 1970s
when the misperceptions on potential output turned out to be more severe. Moreover, Kuha
and Temple (2003) show that measurement error in quadratic regressions tends to hide the
presence of nonlinearities. In the view of these arguments, this paper takes an essential step
9towards asymmetric preferences by extending the available evidence on monetary policy rules
using revised data.
A further reason for nonlinearity is associated with the point estimates of the natural
rate of real activity. Meyer, Swanson and Wieland (2001) show that in periods of heightened
uncertainty about the NAIRU, the central bank may face an incentive to move policy rates
only for su¢ciently large deviations of unemployment from the target. While potentially
relevant, this hypothesis testing would require a real-time series for potential output such as
to re‡ect the policy makers’ beliefs about the state of the economy at the time decisions were
taken. For reasons discussed above, however, weuse theo¢cial estimates ofpotential output,
which are actually revised by the CBO on a regular basis. As these revisions sensibly reduce
the uncertainty about the historical measures of the output gap, this form of nonlinearity is
likely to play only a marginal role in our analysis.
3.2 Reduced-form estimates
We solve equation (5) for it and prior to GMM estimation we replace expectations with
realized values. As customary in the empirical studies, we introduce a lagged dependent
variable to capture interest rate smoothing for which a number of explanations are provided
in the literature (see Woodford, 1999, Sack and Wieland, 2000, and Castelnuovo, 2003).
Accordingly, we estimate the following policy rule:
it =(1¡½)
h
i¤ +c1(¼t ¡¼¤)+c2yt +c3(¼t ¡¼¤)2 +c4 (yt)2
i
+½it¡1 +vt (6)













and the error term is de…ned as
vt ´ ¡(1¡½)
(












The term in curly brackets is a linear combination of forecast errors and therefore vt is or-
thogonal to any variable in the information set available at time t ¡1.
Equation (6) makes clear that the reaction function parameters can only be interpreted as
convolutionsofthecoe¢cientsrepresenting policy makers’ preferencesandthosedescribing the
structureof theeconomy. Although it is not possible to recoverall structural parametersfrom
10a reduced-form single equation, the estimates of the policy rule can identify the asymmetric
preferences as ® = 2c3=c1 and ° = 2c4=c2. In particular, the feedback coe¢cients c3 and c4
embody the relevant information such that the joint restriction c3 = c4 = 0 with c1 6= 0 and
c2 6=0 implies ® =° =0. Hence, testing the hypothesis H0
0 : c3 = c4 = 0 in (6) is equivalent
to testing the hypothesis H0 : ®= ° = 0 in (5). Under the null of a linear reaction function,
which fully corresponds to the null of symmetric preferences, the statistics has an asymptotic
Â2 distribution with as many degrees of freedom as the number of restrictions, and it can be
successfully evaluated through a standard Wald test. As we are considering the auxiliary null
H0
0 : c3 = c4 = 0 rather than the original hypothesis H0 : ® = ° = 0, the statistics is usually
referred to as Wald-type.
In theabsenceoffurther assumptions our method only identi…es the structural parameter
on output gap asymmetry, °, but neither the one on in‡ation, ®, northe target ¼¤, separately.
As the focus of our analysis is on asymmetric preferences, we choose to …x a value for ¼¤.
Speci…cally, we conduct a grid search in the 1% neighborhood of the subsample in‡ation
mean, which is 4:5% for the pre- and 2:8% for the post-1979 period respectively, and we
select the value that provides the best …t. Moreover, as restricting i¤ appears bene…cial for
the convergence of the optimization algorithm, we assume that the subsample average of the
interest rate provides a reasonable approximation for the target.
Table1 reportstheGMM estimatesoftheinterest raterulecoe¢cientsandtheasymmetric
preference parameters for the baseline case, which corresponds to the CBO output gap and
CPI in‡ation. The squared output gap term, c4, is highly signi…cant over the pre-Volcker
regime in the second column but loses most of its explanatory power during the later period
inthethirdcolumn (disregard the last column for the timebeing). Thesquared in‡ation term,
c3, appears relatively morerelevant in thepost-Volcker sample, though it is never statistically
di¤erent from zero at the 5% signi…cance level.
The estimates of the asymmetric preferences parameters are recovered from the feedback
coe¢cients and the standard errors are computed using the delta method. Interestingly, ®
and ° take the expected signs and, in accord to the reduced-form estimates, the asymmetric
preference on output is the signi…cant parameter before1979.6 Speci…cally, a 0:3 estimateof °
implies on impact a 75 point basis cut of the interest rate in responseto a negative 2% output
6The results are robust to letting the pre-Volcker sample begin in 1966:1 when the Federal funds rate …rst
traded consistently above the discount rate.
11gap but only a 42 point basis rise in response to a positive 2% gap. By contrast, after 1982
both coe¢cients become of limited importanceand the Wald-type statistics in the second but
last row indicates that the null hypothesis of symmetric preferences is not rejected at the 5%
signi…cance level, although it is rejected at the 10% level.
Finally, in order to gauge the forecasting advantages of the nonlinear (as opposed to
the linear) monetary policy rule, we perform a version of the Diebold and Mariano (1995)
test, which is designed to detect any di¤erence in the predictive accuracy of two competing
forecasts. To this end, we …rst compute the dynamically simulated …tted values of the two
models and then we calculate the corresponding root-mean-squared error (RMSE) over both
sub-samples. The RMSE of the linear model is 0:96 in the pre-Volcker period and 0:65 in the
post-Volcker period, while the values of the nonlinear model are 0:78 and 0:63, respectively.
The Diebold-Mariano test rejects the null hypothesis of no di¤erence in the accuracy of the
two speci…cations only during the pre-1979 regime, and it thus corroborates the results of the
Wald-type tests for the presence of asymmetric preferences.
3.3 Robustness checks
We assess now in turn the robustness of our …ndings to subsample stability and to alternative
measures ofin‡ationandoutput gap. Thelast columnofTable1 displaystheestimates for the
sample 1987:3 - 2003:2, which corresponds to the tenureofAlan Greenspan as Fed Chairman.
The squared in‡ation and output gaps do not have any explanatory power and translate into
values of ® and ° that are not statistically di¤erent from zero at any conventional level. This
holds truealso fortheir joint signi…canceas shown by the p-valueofthe Wald test. Moreover,
the parameter on in‡ation takes now a negative sign consistently with the view that de‡ation
may have recently become the most imminent risk for the Fed.
Table 2 reports the estimates obtained using, everything equals, the rate of change in the
GDP de‡ator as measure of in‡ation. The squared terms line up with those in Table 1 and
translate into meaningful preference parameters. Speci…cally, the coe¢cient on output gap,
°, always takes a negative sign and is signi…cant only during the pre-Volcker era, while the
coe¢cient on in‡ation, ®, is never statistically di¤erent from zero. Lastly, the Wald statistics
con…rm that asymmetric preferences matter before 1979, but not after 1982.
We re-estimate the policy rule (6) using CPI in‡ation and the Hodrick-Prescott …ltered
output. The results are shown in Table 3 and they bear out those from the previous tables.
12A signi…cant, negative value of the feedback coe¢cient c4 over the …rst sub-sample maps into
a signi…cant, negative value of the asymmetric preference on output, whereas no asymmetry
is detected for in‡ation. Once more, the null hypothesis of symmetric preferences is rejected
only during the pre-Volcker regime.
3.4 Structural estimates
Oneeconometricissuewemust confront withisthat, insmall samples, nonlinearGMM may be
sensitive to the normalization of the orthogonality conditions (see Fuhrer, Moore and Schuh,
1995). Moreover, speci…c parameterizations of the central bank Euler equation may allow us
to draw direct inference on the structural parameters ® and °. To address these issues, we
rearrange the targeting rule in two alternative forms that we view as most natural for the
problem at hand. To keep consistency with the reduced-form speci…cation, we introduce a
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(8)
The latter speci…cations make it possible to estimate ® and ° directly, and since these are
the structural parameters of the model, we refer to the values inferred upon (7) and (8) as
structural estimates.
An advantage of these normalizations relative to the reduced-form (6) is that they do not
implicitly impose a non-zero value for the weight on the interest rate level stabilization ¹.
Moreover, to the extent that the in‡ation level and the output gap level signi…cantly enter
the central bank policy rule, as they virtually do in all empirical literature, the reduced-
form coe¢cient on the interest rate gap (it ¡i¤) is informative about ¹ such that a positive,




¸') implies a positive, signi…cant value for ¹.
While it is not possible to identify this policy preference parameter, we can evaluate whether
it is statistically di¤erent from zero and since the test is performed on the convolution rather
than on ¹ directly, we refer to it as a t-type test.
13Weestimate®and° using nonlinearGMM and theset ofinstruments, zt¡1, whichincludes
the measures of in‡ation and output gap in the baseline case. The reduced-form coe¢cients
are recovered from the estimates of the conditions (7) and (8) while the standard errors are
computed using the delta method. The results for the …rst and the second normalization are
reported in Table 4 and Table 5 respectively.
The structural estimates con…rm, by and large, the reduced-form evidence. The implied
cis (i = 1, 2, 3 and 4) are in most cases not statistically di¤erent from the estimates of the
previoustablesandthey provideempirical support forthepresence ofasymmetricpreferences.
The squared variables do never have explanatory power with the exception of the output gap
in the pre-Volcker sample, whose estimate, c4, is negative and signi…cant. The structural
parameter ® is never statistically di¤erent from zero whereas the signi…cant values of ° over
the …rst sample are in line with the reduced-form estimates. In accord with the results of the
previous tables, the joint null of symmetric central bank preferences, which is now directly
testedon® and °, is rejected beforebut not after1979. Lastly, thet-typestatisticsforthenull
hypothesis ¹ =0 indicate that the central bank penalizes also the ‡uctuations of the interest
rate level and therefore they validate the restriction implicitly imposed by the reduced-form
representation (6).
3.5 Discussion
It is useful at this point to compare our estimates with the results from some recent studies
that also focus on the policy regime shift of 1979. Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000) estimate a
forward-looking linearreactionfunction forthepre-Volckerperiod and report valuesof0:68 for
the coe¢cient on CPI in‡ation (s.e.=0:06) and 0:28 for the coe¢cient on CBOoutput (s.e.=
0:08). Their estimates suggest that neglecting the squared output gap, which signi…cantly
entersourempirical speci…cationwith a negativesign, introducesa downward biasin thelinear
estimate.7 Turning to the nonlinear speci…cations, Dolado, Maria-Dolores and Ruge-Murcia
(2003) use a Clarida, Galí and Gertler-type of rule augmented with a generated regressor for
the conditional variance of in‡ation and …nd no evidence for this form of nonlinearity. Kim,
Osborne and Sensier (2004) use a semi-parametric method of estimation and show that only
the asymmetry over the output gap has been sizable.
The post-Volcker estimates of the parameters on the in‡ation level and the output gap
7This result holds true also for the alternative measures of in‡ation and output gap.
14level are not statistically di¤erent fromthevaluesreported inClarida, Galí and Gertler (2000),
and therefore they con…rm a limited role for nonlinearity during the last two decades. These
results are consistent with those in Kim, Osborne and Sensier (2004) while they are only
marginally so with those in Dolado, Maria-Dolores and Ruge-Murcia (2003). The absence
of an output gap objective in the latter however seems a natural candidate to explain the
di¤erence. Lastly, we line up with earlier contributions in that the coe¢cient on the in‡ation
level becomes bigger than one moving from the pre- to the post-1979 period.
4 The average in‡ation bias
Theestimatesoftheprevioussectionsupport thenotionofanovel in‡ation biasdueto Cukier-
man (2002). In the presence of an asymmetric objective over the output gap and uncertainty
about the state of the economy, the monetary authorities face an incentive to respond more
aggressively to output contractions of a given amount than to output expansions of the same
magnitude. The reason is that the expected marginal bene…t of a policy intervention is con-
vex in the output gap, meaning that to satisfy the Euler equation and stimulate aggregate
demand the policy makers cut the interest rate by more the worse the economic outlook is.
As the private sector correctly anticipates such an incentive, the precautionary stance of the
monetary policy generates a systematic boost in in‡ation expectations even though, unlike in
Barro and Gordon (1983), the central bank targets output at potential.8
4.1 A model-based measure of the in‡ation mean
This section proposes a simple strategy to measure the asymmetric preferences induced in‡a-
tion bias, which is de…ned as the di¤erence between the model-based in‡ation mean and the
in‡ation target. The resulting expression is isomorphic to the one that Surico (2003) derives
as the di¤erence between the optimal policies under discretion and under commitment using
an asymmetric central bank objective and a Lucas aggregate supply.
On the basis of the empirical results presented in the previous section, we impose the
8In the theory of consumption, a precautionary motive emerges from the interaction between non-quadratic
preferences and labor income risks such as to generate above-average saving rates in periods of high uncer-
tainty. As shown by Kimball (1990), a necessary and su¢cient condition for a precautionary saving is that
the expected marginal utility be convex in consumption. Analogously here, the above-average in‡ation comes
from the interaction between an asymmetric central bank objective and uncertainty about the state of the
economy. Moreover, as the expected marginal loss is concave in the output gap, this motive can be thought as
a precautionary demand for expansions.
15restriction ® = 0 into the …rst order condition of the central bank optimization problem
(5).The corresponding augmented targeting rule writes
Et¡1f[¡(it ¡i¤) +(1 ¡½)(c1 (¼t ¡¼¤) +c2yt +c4y2
t) +½(it¡1 ¡i¤)]zt¡1g = 0 (9)
where the parameters are written in reduced-form for expositional convenience.
The maintained assumption that the target i¤ equals the sample mean of interest rate,
combined with the empirically grounded restriction of a symmetric preference over in‡ation
allow us to uniquely identify the in‡ation target. To see this, notice that the constant in the
above expression becomes nothing but the convolution (¡c1¼¤).9 The average in‡ation bias
can then be computed by taking the unconditional expectation of equation (9). According to










where we have used the fact that the output gap has an unconditional distribution with zero
mean and variance ¾2
y.
The average in‡ation bias arises here because policy preferences are asymmetric with
respect to the output gap rather than because the desired level of output is above potential
like in Barro and Gordon (1983). The distortion increases with the degree of asymmetry,
and to the extent that the penalty associated to an output contraction is larger than the
penalty associated to an output expansion of the same size, the model predicts ° < 0. As ¸
and k are positive, the di¤erence between the model-based in‡ation mean and the in‡ation
target represents an in‡ation bias rather than a de‡ation bias. When ° is equal to zero,
the expected marginal bene…t of a policy intervention becomes linear and the in‡ation bias
disappears together with the precautionary motive.
The averagein‡ation bias is proportional to the variance of the output gap and, as shown
by the …rst equality in (10), it is inversely related to the in‡ation slope of the targeting rule
(9). Hence, the model is general enough to confront the explanatory power of a change in the
asymmetric preference parameter over the output gap, °, with two alternative interpretations
of the behavior of US in‡ation. The …rst is a shift in the response to the in‡ation level as
captured by c1. The second is a di¤erence in the variance of the shocks as proxied by ¾2
y.
9It is worth noticing that the assumption on the interest rate target should bias, if any, the in‡ation target
towards the sample mean of in‡ation. This suggests that our estimates are likely to understate the contribution
of the asymmetric preferences induced bias to the actual mean of US in‡ation.
164.2 Measuring the bias
We estimate equation (9) using GMM with a four lag Newey-West estimate of the covariance
matrix. The measures ofin‡ation and output gaps and theinstrumental variables refer to the
baseline case. The only di¤erence relativeto Table1 is that, inlinewith therestriction c3 = 0,
the four lags of the squared in‡ation are not included here as instruments. The results are
shown in Table 6 and they turn out to be su¢ciently close to those reported in the previous
tables that wedo not comment further. The restrictions discussed aboveallows us to identify
the in‡ation target, which is found to move from 3:61% before 1979 to a statistically lower
2:77% during the last two decades. Interestingly enough, this result contrasts with most of
the empirical literature on monetary policy rules that, neglecting asymmetric preferences on
the output gap and therefore imposing a linear reaction function, usually …nd a di¤erence in
¼¤ across subsamples of two-to-three percentage points.






, and the delta method to obtain the standard errors. Table 7 displays the results.
The average in‡ation bias, which is reported in the second row, is sizable and statistically
di¤erent from zero only in the pre-Volcker period. The model-based in‡ation mean in the
fourth row con…rms that wee¤ectively decompose the actual in‡ation mean into a target and
a bias argument. Moreover, a shift in the policy preferences on output stabilization appears
to account for a larger fraction of the di¤erence in the sub-samples mean of in‡ation relative
to a reduction in the in‡ation target.
The results in Table 6 and Table 7 suggest that while a di¤erent interest rate response
to the in‡ation level, as described by the rise of c1, and a more favorable macroeconomic
environment, as summarized by thedecline in the standard deviation of the output gap, have
also played a role, a change in thepolicy preferenceon output from asymmetric to symmetric
appears crucial to account for the observation that US in‡ation has been on average higher
during the 1960s and 1970s than during the 1980s and 1990s.
5 Conclusions
The contribution of this paper is twofold. At the theoretical level it derives the analytical so-
lution ofthecentral bank optimization problem when thepolicy preferences areasymmetricin
both in‡ation and output gaps, and themonetary transmission mechanism is New-Keynesian.
17The speci…cation of the policy objectives is general enough to nest the quadratic form as a
special case and therefore it translates into a potentially nonlinear targeting rule. This fea-
ture forms the basis of our hypothesis testing for the presenceof asymmetric preferences as it
allows to reversely engineer potential evidence of nonlinearities in the reaction function into
evidence of asymmetries in the policy objective.
At the empirical level this paper shows that US monetary policy can be e¤ectively char-
acterized by a nonlinear policy rule only during the pre-Volcker regime, with the interest rate
response to the state of the business cycle being the dominant type of nonlinearity. In par-
ticular, the Fed appears to have historically attached a larger weight to output contractions
than to output expansions of the same magnitude such as to induce an average in‡ation bias
of 1:11%. The latter can account for a sizable fraction of the in‡ation rise observed during
the 1960s and 1970s. These …ndings are robust across alternative measures of in‡ation and
output gap, as well as across alternative estimation strategies.
Altogether, this paper providesempirical support for asymmetricpreferences and suggests
some caution about using symmetric loss functions as a guide to policy analysis. Promising
strands of literature have recently emphasized that political pressures, labor market frictions
andheterogeneity inportfolio holdingscan makethecostsofbusiness‡uctuationsand in‡ation
variation asymmetric. Along these lines, a stimulating avenue for future research is to derive
an utility-based welfarefunction within richer models of the business cyclein order to provide
a formal microfoundation for an asymmetric central bank objective.
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Table 1: Reduced-form Estimates
- baseline measures of inflation and output gap -
1960:1 – 1979:2 1982:4 2003:2 1987:3 – 2003:2
c1     0.80**
(0.06)
    1.45**
(0.22)
    2.74**
(0.34)
c2     0.79**
(0.11)
    0.95**
(0.17)














  ρ     0.63**
(0.04)
    0.80**
(0.02)


























W(2) p-value 0.000 0.078 0.121
J(19) p-value 0.960 0.874 0.963








Notes: Standard errors using a four lag Newey-West covariance matrix are reported in
brackets. Inflation is measured as the change in the consumer price index (cpi) and the
output gap is obtained using the CBO potential output. The instrument set includes four
lags of cpi inflation, squared cpi inflation, cbo output gap, squared cbo output gap, the
fed funds rate and the rate of change in the gdp deflator. The asymmetric preference
parameters are computed as α =2c3/c1 and γ =2c4/c2 while the standard errors are obtained
using the delta method. W(n) refers to the Wald-type statistics of the test for n parameter
restrictions, which is distributed as a χ
2(n) under the joint null hypothesis c3=c4=0. The
latter is equivalent to the original null of symmetric central bank preferences, α =γ =0.
J(m) refers to the statistics of Hansen’s test for m overidentifying restrictions which is
distributed as a χ
2(m) under the null hypothesis of valid overidentifying restrictions. The
superscript ** and * denote the rejection of the null hypothesis that the true coefficient is
zero at the 1 percent and 5 percent significance levels, respectively.23
Table 2: Reduced-form Estimates
- alternative measure of inflation -
1960:1 – 1979:2 1982:4 2003:2
c1     0.81**
(0.08)
    3.29**
(0.63)
c2     1.07**
(0.13)










  ρ     0.65**
(0.04)


















W(2) p-value 0.000 0.194
J(19) p-value 0.959 0.985








Notes: Standard errors using a four lag Newey-West covariance matrix are reported in
brackets. Inflation is measured as the rate change in the gdp deflator and the output gap is
obtained using the CBO potential output. The instrument set includes four lags of gdp
inflation, squared gdp inflation, cbo output gap, squared cbo output gap, the fed funds
rate and cpi inflation. The asymmetric preference parameters are computed as α =2c3/c1
and γ =2c4/c2 while the standard errors are obtained using the delta method. W(n) refers to
the Wald-type statistics of the test for n parameter restrictions, which is distributed as a
χ
2(n) under the joint null hypothesis c3=c4=0. The latter is equivalent to the original null
of symmetric central bank preferences, α =γ =0. J(m) refers to the statistics of Hansen’s
test for m overidentifying restrictions which is distributed as a χ
2(m) under the null
hypothesis of valid overidentifying restrictions. The superscript ** and * denote the
rejection of the null hypothesis that the true coefficient is zero at the 1 percent and 5
percent significance levels, respectively.24
Table 3: Reduced-form Estimates
- alternative measure of output gap -
1960:1 – 1979:2 1982:4 2003:2
c1     0.67**
(0.09)
    2.63**
(0.34)
c2     1.45**
(0.31)










  ρ     0.72**
(0.05)


















W(2) p-value 0.000 0.161
J(19) p-value 0.969 0.895








Notes: Standard errors using a four lag Newey-West covariance matrix are reported in
brackets. Inflation is measured as changes in the cpi and the output gap is obtained with
the Hodrick-Prescott (H-P) filter (smoothing parameter = 1600). The instrument set
includes four lags of cpi inflation, squared cpi inflation, H-P output gap, squared H-P
output gap, the fed funds rate and gdp inflation. The asymmetric preference parameters
are computed as α =2c3/c1 and γ =2c4/c2 while the standard errors are obtained using the
delta method. W(n) refers to the Wald-type statistics of the test for n parameter
restrictions, which is distributed as a χ
2(n) under the joint null hypothesis c3=c4=0. The
latter is equivalent to the original null of symmetric central bank preferences, α =γ =0.
J(m) refers to the statistics of Hansen’s test for m overidentifying restrictions which is
distributed as a χ
2(m) under the null hypothesis of valid overidentifying restrictions. The
superscript ** and * denote the rejection of the null hypothesis that the true coefficient is
zero at the 1 percent and 5 percent significance levels, respectively.25
Table 4: Structural Estimates
- baseline normalization of the orthogonality conditions -
1960:1 – 1979:2 1982:4 2003:2
c1     0.96**
(0.03)
    1.35**
(0.04)
c2     1.15**
(0.16)










  ρ     0.70**
(0.04)




















W(2) p-value 0.000 0.530
J(19) p-value 0.950 0.895
Specification:



































Notes: This table reports the nonlinear GMM estimates of the structural parameters α  and
γ . The estimates of the reduced-form coefficients are recovered from the estimates of the
structural parameters while the standard errors are computed using the delta method.
Inflation, output gap and the instrument set zt-1 correspond to the baseline measures
described in the notes to Table 1. The t-type test refers to the null hypothesis (µ/κϕ) =0.
W(n) refers to the Wald-type statistics of the test for n parameter restrictions, which is
distributed as a χ
2(n) under the joint null hypothesis α =γ =0. J(m) refers to the statistics of
Hansen’s test for m overidentifying restrictions which is distributed as a χ
2(m) under the
null hypothesis of valid overidentifying restrictions. The superscript ** and * denote the
rejection of the null hypothesis that the true coefficient is zero at the 1 percent and 5
percent significance levels, respectively.26
Table 5: Structural Estimates
- alternative normalization of the orthogonality conditions -
1960:1 – 1979:2 1982:4 2003:2
c1     0.79*
(0.08)
    3.64**
(0.77)
c2     1.11**
(0.06)










  ρ     0.65**
(0.02)




















W(2) p-value 0.000 0.423
J(19) p-value 0.949 0.876
Specification:




































Notes: This table reports the nonlinear GMM estimates of the structural parameters α  and
γ . The estimates of the reduced-form coefficients are recovered from the estimates of the
structural parameters while the standard errors are computed using the delta method.
Inflation, output gap and the instrument set zt-1 correspond to the baseline measures
described in the notes to Table 1. The t-type test refers to the null hypothesis (µ/λϕ) =0.
W(n) refers to the Wald-type statistics of the test for n parameter restrictions, which is
distributed as a χ
2(n) under the joint null hypothesis α =γ =0. J(m) refers to the statistics of
Hansen’s test for m overidentifying restrictions which is distributed as a χ
2(m) under the
null hypothesis of valid overidentifying restrictions. The superscript ** and * denote the
rejection of the null hypothesis that the true coefficient is zero at the 1 percent and 5
percent significance levels, respectively.27
Table 6: Inferring the Inflation Target
- baseline measures of inflation and output gap -
1960:1 – 1979:2 1982:4 2003:2
c1     0.82**
(0.06)
    2.60**
(0.72)
c2     0.84**
(0.19)










  ρ     0.68**
(0.06)






ππππ *    3.61**
(0.31)










J(16) p-value 0.897 0.793






Notes: Standard errors using a four lag Newey-West covariance matrix are reported in
brackets. Inflation is measured as the change in the consumer price index (cpi) and the
output gap is obtained using the CBO potential output. The instrument set includes four
lags of cpi inflation, cbo output gap, squared cbo output gap, the fed funds rate and the
rate of change in the gdp deflator. The asymmetric preference parameter on inflation is
restricted to zero while the one on the output gap is computed as γ =2c4/c2. The standard
errors are obtained using the delta method. J(m) refers to the statistics of Hansen’s test
for  m overidentifying restrictions which is distributed as a χ
2(m) under the null
hypothesis of valid overidentifying restrictions. The superscript ** and * denote the
rejection of the null hypothesis that the true coefficient is zero at the 1 percent and 5
percent significance levels, respectively.28
Table 7: Inflation Mean and its Components
1960:1 – 1979:2 1982:4 2003:2




Inflation Target     3.61**
(0.31)




   4.72**
(0.26)
   3.09**
(0.50)




















π σ π π − = − =
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. The average inflation bias, which is defined as
the difference between the model-based average inflation and the inflation target, is
recovered from the estimates of the interest rate reaction function reported in Table 6
as (-c4"y
2/c1). The standard errors are obtained using the delta method. The superscript
** and * denote the rejection of the null hypothesis that the true coefficient is zero at
the 1 percent and 5 percent significance levels, respectively.29
Figure 1: Preference over Output Stabilization
-  cubic vs. quadratic –
The horizontal axis spans the range of historical values for the CBO output
gap during the sample 1960:1 – 2003:2 while the value of gamma in the
asymmetric specification is consistent with the estimates reported below.30
Figure 2: Federal Funds Rate, CPI Inflation and CBO Output Gap
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